Enron Mail |
Scott, I appreicate your feedback and closure on these items. It helps us to build
that confidence that the systems are working correctly instead of being left in "limbo" and coming up with your own conclusions. Thanks. Lynn -----Original Message----- From: Abshire, Scott Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2001 3:36 PM To: Hotte, Steve; Corman, Shelley; Holmes, Bradley; Dietz, Rick; January, Steven; Blair, Lynn; Nacey, Sheila; Bryant, Mike; Scott, Donna; Taylor, Gina; Kenagy, Gary; Tombaugh, Elaine; Osburn, Frank; Gigliotti, Mark; Mayer, Tony; Rahn, Nick; Sawyer, Lisa; Sullivan, Michael Cc: McAuliffe, Bob; Rub, Jenny; Ritter, Steve; Gearhart, Jim; Azore, Derica ; Becker, Diane; Borger, Fawn; Brown, Edward; Bunch, Dan; Cantu, Lupita; Cernoch, Sandra; Cooper, Dori; Cowley, Mark; Daze, Don; Dennis, Patti; Dunten, Deborah; Estes, Brandon; Hollan, Celestine; Ignjatic, Vladimir; Jakovljevic, Dejan; Juarez, Francisca; King, Bruce; Krumpholz, Chad; Love, Chris; Lukken, Randy; Lutz, Sheila; Maze, Gene; McFarland, Jean; Mitchell, Russell; Nguyen, Quy Si; O'Gorman, Karon; Palik, Joe; Parchem, Matthew; Patnaik, Anoop; Perez, Kim; Pursell, Glenn; Rasmussen, Michael; Ryzinski Jr., Stan; Sampson, Tom; Sims, Ronnie; Smith, Chris A.; Sroka, Thomas; Stephens, Susan; Steward, Larry; Stiles, Lewis; Stovall, Glenn; Strader, Kelly; Sumpter, James; Temple, Arlena; Theobald, Tyler; Vollmer, Mary; Wagner, Glenda; Wendt, Richard; Wilhelm, John; Wilkins, Tony; Wojcik Jr., Ed Subject: Infrastructure Prevents... All, Recent events have had us reporting virus outbreaks and outages which have impacted business and communications. With these incidents, we have had several meetings to discuss communications in times of crisis to ensure consistent, validated content and appropriate mediums to use for that content. All to ensure everyone impacted is notified timely with accurate status. Since Friday (09/21), there have been three (3) incidents that have confronted our environment which did not impact our business due to our fault tolerance, pro-active measures and relationship with Enron Networks. All of these incidents could have had a serious impact to our business, so I thought it important to communicate these incidents and how they were handled which prevented any business impact. 09/24 - 25: W32.Vote.A@mm virus Working with Enron Networks, we were able to patch all servers and workstations in ETS Houston and Omaha, ETS Field Operations, Azurix and EOTT. Below is a URL which conveys the damage potential this virus has which we avoided. Teams had to work through the night, but the end result was no business impact. http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.vote.a@mm.html 09/22: Power hit at Ardmore Data Center Facility During the morning of Saturday, lighting struck near the Ardmore data center facility knocking out all power. The battery backup systems assumed the system load while the generators came on-line. The Ardmore facility ran on generators through the day until power was re-established with Reliant. ETS' production SAN and the majority of our production database servers reside at Ardmore. No systems were affected. 09/21 SAN Drive Errors On Friday morning, one of the production drives on our Hitachi SAN reported drive errors. The SAN phoned home for support, a support technician was dispatched and the drive reporting errors was replaced within 1 hour, 20 minutes. Upon the detection of drive errors, the SAN engaged an on-line hot spare as a replacement which assumed the function of the drive with errors. The drive was replaced, data replicated back over, and we were back live in our original configuration. It is important to note that new devices have an infant mortality rate for initial errors detected after shipping. This rate usually occurs within 60 days of production go-live. Impact to the business: None. These are 3 examples where our infrastructure withstood incidents. I believe this communication is just as important as the communication we all desire in times of crisis. Thanks, -Scott.
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