|
|
Enron Mail |
Late in the afternoon on Friday May 25, FERC issued an order providing=20
clarification and preliminary guidance on implementation of the mitigation= =20 and monitoring plan for the California wholesale electric markets that it= =20 adopted on April 26. The order is limited to clarifying four critical issue= s=20 prior to the Mitigation Plan's May 29 (today) effective date: (1) treatment= =20 of generators who did not supply heat and emission rates; (2) calculation o= f=20 a natural gas proxy price; (3) price mitigation in the ISO's spot markets= =20 other than Imbalance Energy; and (4) creditworthiness. The order does not= =20 resolve the rehearing requests, nor does it accept or reject the ISO's=20 proposed tariff amendments for filing. These pleadings are still under=20 review and FERC will address them in a separate order. =20 Treatment of Generators Who Did Not Supply Heat and Emission Rates FERC accepts the ISO=01,s proposal for generating units within California= =20 (including non-public utility generating units) that have not supplied heat= =20 and emission rates in compliance with the April 26 Order: For the generating units that have not provided the requisite data or whose= =20 data the ISO believes to be inadequate, the ISO will use data from a viable= =20 alternative source (e.g., either current or pre-existing Reliability Must-R= un=20 Contracts). If an alternative source of data does not exist and the=20 generating unit continues to refuse to supply the requisite information, th= e=20 ISO will treat the non-compliant generators as price-takers, i.e., the ISO= =20 will assume a $0/MWh bid for all available capacity from these units. Thes= e=20 generators, if dispatched, will be paid the market clearing price. =20 The FERC finds that to the extent a non-compliant seller does not wish to b= e=20 treated as a price-taker, the ISO's approach will provide such entities wit= h=20 an incentive to provide the ISO and the Commission with the requisite data. Calculation of a Natural Gas Proxy Price FERC rejects the ISO proposal to calculate a proxy natural gas cost based= =20 upon the simple average of Gas Daily index prices for Malin, PG&E CityGate,= =20 and Southern California Border (Kern River Station). The ISO is directed t= o=20 calculate the natural gas proxy price using the published daily prices for= =20 Malin, PG&E CityGate, Southern California Border (Kern River Station),=20 SoCalGas large packages, and PG&E large packages. The Commission will=20 consider whether any changes should be made to the California delivery poin= ts=20 during rehearing of the April 26 Order. =20 Price Mitigation in the ISO's Spot Markets other than Imbalance Energy The FERC finds that the ISO erred in its interpretation- that it does not= =20 intend to apply any price mitigation to its Ancillary Services spot markets= =20 or Adjustment Bids. The April 26 Order did not explicitly address the issue= =20 of price mitigation in any market other than that for Imbalance Energy, the= =20 order nonetheless noted that "this proceeding was established . . . to=20 address whether a price mitigation plan was needed to replace the $150/MWh= =20 breakpoint methodology." The $150/MWh breakpoint methodology applied to th= e=20 ISO's Ancillary Services markets. Therefore, the ISO must replace the=20 $150/MWh breakpoint methodology in those markets with the superseding=20 methodology adopted in the April 26 Order. The Commission further clarifie= s=20 that the April 26 Order did not replace the ISO's current methodology for= =20 mitigating Adjustment Bid prices. With respect to calculating the market clearing price for Ancillary Service= s,=20 FERC directs the ISO to use each relevant average hourly mitigated Imbalanc= e=20 Energy price. If the Ancillary Services markets clear below the average=20 hourly mitigated Imbalance Energy price for that hour, then the ISO will pa= y=20 the Ancillary Services clearing price for that market. If the Ancillary=20 Services markets clear above the average hourly mitigated Imbalance Energy= =20 price, then the ISO will use that price to clear the market and will pay=20 as-bid for all Ancillary Services that are needed above the mitigated price= . =20 Bids accepted above the mitigated price will be subject to refund and=20 justification. =20 Creditworthiness As of May 29, 2001, FERC expects the ISO to ensure the presence of a=20 creditworthy buyer for all transactions made with all generators who offer= =20 power in compliance with the must-offer requirement in the Mitigation Plan.= =20 - EL00-95.1.WPD
|