Enron Mail

From:rebecca.cantrell@enron.com
To:james.steffes@enron.com
Subject:Re: Natural Gas Basis Differential - Why so Big?
Cc:phillip.allen@enron.com, tim.belden@enron.com, ray.alvarez@enron.com,alan.comnes@enron.com, leslie.lawner@enron.com, rebecca.cantrell@enron.com, robert.neustaedter@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, jeff.dasovich@enron.com, joe.hartsoe@enron.com
Bcc:phillip.allen@enron.com, tim.belden@enron.com, ray.alvarez@enron.com,alan.comnes@enron.com, leslie.lawner@enron.com, rebecca.cantrell@enron.com, robert.neustaedter@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, jeff.dasovich@enron.com, joe.hartsoe@enron.com
Date:Wed, 2 May 2001 04:47:00 -0700 (PDT)

This story from today's Gas Daily doesn't help -- note the last sentence:

***Calif. gas and power prices: Joined at the hip?
When gas reaches the California border, something happens to the price.
The same goes
for the power market. But how closely are the prices of gas and power linked?
Over the past several months, it has become fashionable to declare that
power prices
and gas prices are dependent on one another, rising and falling in sync. In a
recent FERC
public meeting, for instance, transportation differentials were fingered as
the main
culprits for the cost of wholesale power in California (GD 4/27).
At first glance, the evidence seems to support this point. From one
perspective, it does
appear that the two markets do indeed reach bottoms and ceilings at the same
time.
But on closer examination, power and gas prices over the last year were
often out of
sync -- even in California. When we view prices in major wholesale power
markets relative
to prices in major producing areas serving California, we also find little or
no
relationship, especially in terms of the magnitude of the change in price.
For the last six months, the price of gas in California has generally
stayed above the
cost of gas in the major producing basins supplying gas to California. The
resulting
difference in price -- the basis between California gas and producing area
gas -- most often
exceeded the cost of transporting the gas to California severalfold.
On Dec. 11, the cost of gas in California was about 10 times as great as
the cost in
every producing area from which it receives gas. And it was very similar to
the cost of
power at Palo Verde, a major wholesale power market serving California.
The average index price of gas at Gas Daily SoCal Gas (large pkgs) major
wholesale
market on Dec. 11 was $59.42/mmBtu. Measured in Btu equivalent, the power
market was
almost the same. Using a heat rate of 8mmBtu/MWh to make the conversion from
megawatt-
hours to mmBtu, the average or index price of power at Megawatt Daily Palo
Verde major
wholesale power market on the same day was $61.13/mmBtu.
The power and gas prices on Dec. 11 followed a steep uplift in price for
both power and
gas begun on Nov. 2. Those peak prices have not been exceeded since.
By comparison, power prices on Nov. 2 were $7.06/mmBtu, while gas prices
were
$5.30/mmBtu. Thus, gas prices at $59.42/mmBtu on Dec. 11 had increased by a
factor of
10 in a little more than a month.
Even though gas prices increased in the major producing regions as well
and behaved
in interesting ways (GD 4/12, GD 12/01/00), the increase in California gas
prices was so
great it was as if they had not changed at all (see figure below).
On 19 of the 25 trading days between the price trough on Nov. 2 and the
peak on Dec.
11, gas and power prices were stepping up in sync. Increases (or decreases)
in power
prices were coupled with increases (decreases) in power prices. Yet the
initial rate of
increase was much greater for power than for gas.
Between Nov. 2 and Nov. 15, power prices increased from $7.06/mmBtu to
$25.75/mmBtu while gas prices only increased from $5.30/mmBtu to $8.20/mmBtu.
After
Nov. 15, gas prices began to take off. It was as if the initial large
increase in power prices
in the first 10 trading days following Nov. 2 had served as a catalyst for
the subsequent
large increase in gas prices.
On Nov. 15, the spark spread was $17.50/mmBtu or $140/MWh, suggesting
huge profits
for companies obtaining gas for generating power for sale on the wholesale
market. As
wholesale gas prices caught up to wholesale power prices, however, the spark
spread
declined significantly. By Nov. 21 the spark spread was only $1.08/MmBtu.
From a selective view of price such as the rise in Nov. 2000, it appears
that power
prices and gas prices are dependent on one another -- that is, when power
prices increased
gas prices increased as well and visa versa.
But the variability of the spark spread for California markets reveals
the lack of a
simple relationship between power and gas prices (see figure below). The
large volatility of
the spark spread apparent from the price plot is largely determined by the
volatility of
the power price.
Interestingly enough, it is not always clear why power and gas are well
connected when
they are well connected or even why they behave the way they do at these
times.
Most recent statistics available from the Energy Information
Administration indicate
that net generation of power from utility and merchant plants in California
between
September and October 2000 declined by 9%. Gas consumption at these power
plants also
declined by 9%. It is not surprising, then, that power prices declined in
October 2000
from September 2000 levels.
As consumption of gas at power generators fell by an additional 63
billion cf between
October and November, prices of both gas and power not only rose but also
rose in sync.
Thus, while gas consumption for power generation was 79 billion cf, or about
50% below
its September level, prices were significantly higher.
Did gas prices rise in November because of an overall significant
increase in gas
demand by all sectors in November from October levels? According to the most
recent EIA
statistics, this was not the case. Deliveries to all sectors were almost even
in October and
November, differing by only 3 billion cf.
An understanding of observed price behavior of wholesale gas and power
never comes
easy, but one lesson is abundantly clear: those who either hold firm rights
for
transportation of gas into California or are managing these rights are
sitting pretty while
those who don't have such rights and need gas are skating on thin ice. --
John H.
Herbert, jhh1@msn.com





James D Steffes@ENRON
05/02/2001 11:15 AM
To: Phillip K Allen/HOU/ECT@ECT, Tim Belden/HOU/ECT@ECT, Ray
Alvarez/NA/Enron@ENRON, Alan Comnes/PDX/ECT@ECT, Leslie
Lawner/NA/Enron@Enron, Rebecca W Cantrell/HOU/ECT@ECT, Robert
Neustaedter/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Christi L
Nicolay/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron
cc: Joe Hartsoe/Corp/Enron@ENRON
Subject: Natural Gas Basis Differential - Why so Big?




Joe Hartsoe received a call from Commission staff at FERC to try and
understand why basis differentials into California were so big and why the
large basis continues. Clearly with the new Electricity Order, natural gas
is one of the primary factors on electricity prices in California.

Our key fear, however small, is that FERC (or someone else) recognizes the
huge implication of natural gas prices and seeks to cap natural gas sales for
resale of P/L affiliates (such as ENA). There is some fear that the real
monopoly is the holder of LT firm capacity, not the gas production firms.

We need to develop a good story as to why the basis gas continues and
messaging it quietly into the right FERC staff to keep the pressure of
additional Investigations from happening. Joe is trying to get his hands on
the Lukens study presented to the California study Committee on natural gas
abuse to help guide our analysis.

Jim