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Enron Mail |
Here is my first take on?a few?key messages.? I'll forward a few more alon=
g=20 shortly. It is beyond reason that the committee is focusing so heavily on a company = =20 that represented only a low single-digit percentage of spot market purchase= s=20 and whose average price was 25%-40% lower than the cost of the state=01,s= =20 average purchase. ? The committee appears to be basing its pursuits on politics and geography = =20 rather than the realities of the marketplace. Enron transactions represent= =20 less than one=01)half of one percent of alleged overcharges, and Enron sal= es to=20 the state between January 18 and May 31 represented just one-tenth of the= =20 dollar value of power purchases made from Los Angeles-area public utilitie= s =20 alone. ? If the committee is truly dedicated to finding the causes of increases in = =20 power prices, it should look closely at what happened within the state=01,s= =20 borders. California-based public utilities, for example, sold power to the= =20 state at average prices as high as $100/MWh above Enron=01,s average. It a= lso=20 should examine why the Administration and PUC did not allow utilities to= =20 enter into long-term contracts last year that would have saved Californian= s=20 billions of dollars and increased supply. ? For the better part of five (?) years, Enron has repeatedly urged Californ= ia=20 lawmakers and regulators to address the flaws in electric restructuring th= at=20 led to the current energy crisis. We have, and will continue to, offer our= =20 resources and experience to help California secure its long-term energy=20 future.
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