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Enron Mail |
Jim,
1 - Governance: p9/10 covering Scandinavia of the OFFER doc. still broadly reflects the position. Plans to broaden the ownership base of Nord Pool beyond the Norwegian and Swedish SOs to include Finnish and Danish SOs have not yet materialised. 2.- Transmission owner varies by country. In N and S, state-owned entities (Statnett, SvK) that were demerged from state-owned generators (Statkraft, Vattenfall respectively) are the TOs and SOs (bundled). As stated above, NPool is 50/50 owned by Statnett and SvK. Fingrid, Finnish SO is 25% owned by PVO (generator), 25% Fortum (generator), government (12%) and institutional shareholders (38%). In W.Denmark, the distribution companies own the SO, Eltra. In E.Denmark, the situation is somewhat in flux. Elkraft System (SO) is now to be owned the E.DK distcos, rather than the dominant generator, EK Energi. I note that as of 1.01.01, Elkraft System and Elkraft Transmission have been established as separate entities so there is some move to separate, at least mominally, TO and SO roles. However, any consideration of Denmark must acknowledge the consumer ownership model, which is effectively reverse vertical integration: distcos own the dominant generators Finnish and Danish TOs/SOs have no stake in Nord Pool (MO). 3. Participation in Nord Pool remains voluntary. Participants can contract directly with NP or with each other for supply. All tranmission, with some exceptions, is allocated to Nord Pool and rationed and priced through the NP auction. 4. Not quite sure what you mean here. While there are increasing moves to coordinate system operation between the countries, each country has its own balancing market arrangements. Most of the discussion in the OFFER document on Scandinavia still looks good to me. Hope this does the job. Regards Philip Mark Schroeder 04/01/2001 10:38 To: Philip Davies/LON/ECT@ECT cc: James D Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron Subject: Re: NordPool Philip - thanks mcs Jim - I had one more thought after speaking with Jeff, and just wanted to make sure that it had been considered (may have been considered and rejected by now). Any thought to treating the huge debt recently rolled up in a way that is akin to the olds PGA trackers in the gas industry, i.e., allow utilities a cost of capital (even very low, e.g., 5%), than allow a fixed monthly recovery, plus when wholesale (or retail prices) fall below some specified level they can also add in some of the outstanding balance on the debt that has recently accumulated? For example if the price cap is set at 6 cents per kWh, and an additional i cent is allowed for recovery of this debt, total bill is seven. If prices eventually fall to 4 cents in a competitive market (California dreaming!?), then utility can recover 4, plus the 1 cent authorised, plus 2 cents applied toward the old debt (difference between 6 and 4). Customers could still switch suppliers, and might seek supplier who will not add on the 2 cents (good for Enron), but might meet the ratemaking principle that utility has been given reasonable opportunity to recover its costs. Also at least delays, if not a permanent solution, any possible bankruptcy. Just a thought. mcs Philip Davies 04/01/2001 08:49 To: Mark Schroeder cc: Subject: NordPool FYI - I will respond. ---------------------- Forwarded by Philip Davies/LON/ECT on 04/01/2001 08:52 --------------------------- From: James D Steffes@ENRON on 03/01/2001 17:46 CST To: Philip Davies/LON/ECT@ECT cc: Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron Subject: NordPool Philip -- I wanted to make sure that the OFFER memo on Feb 98 still was correct for the NordPool. The key issues we are trying to establish are - 1. Governance 1.b Relationship of Transmission Owner to System Operator and Market Operator 2. Mandatory / Voluntary Participation 3. Energy Pool vs. Balancing Pool If the report is still good, we can probably just pull the answers with some help from you. Jim
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