|
|
Enron Mail |
Cc: kevin-gresham@reliantenergy.com, brenda_b_harris@reliantenergy.com
Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Bcc: kevin-gresham@reliantenergy.com, brenda_b_harris@reliantenergy.com X-From: "Jones, Daniel L." <DLJones@cps-satx.com< X-To: isonp@ercot.com, piwg@ercot.com, operations@ercot.com, manuel-munoz@reliantenergy.com, "'Greer, Clayton'" <cgreer@tnpe.com< X-cc: kevin-gresham@reliantenergy.com, Brenda_B_Harris@reliantenergy.com X-bcc: X-Folder: \Doug_Gilbert_Smith_Nov2001\Notes Folders\All documents X-Origin: GILBERTSMITH-D X-FileName: dsmith.nsf Is Clayton reading it correctly? I must admit that I am having trouble interpreting the proposed solution as well. Also, I would respectfully disagree that the problem (i.e., potential for gaming) exists only when the zonal MCPE is negative. < ---------- < From: Greer, Clayton[SMTP:cgreer@tnpe.com] < Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2000 9:42 AM < To: isonp@ercot.com; piwg@ercot.com; operations@ercot.com; < manuel-munoz@reliantenergy.com < Cc: kevin-gresham@reliantenergy.com; Brenda_B_Harris@reliantenergy.com < Subject: RE: Suggested Solution to the PUC's Concerns Regarding Local < Cong estion < < If I am reading this correctly, it appears that rather than provide an < adjustment for decremental units relieving local congestion, they will be < required to either pay the market clearing price of energy for the zone or < redispatch another unit in the same zone to counter act the decremental < instruction. < < I believe we can support this change as long as few questions are properly < handled: < < If there are multiple units that can clear the local congestion problem, < who < gets selected? (best shift factor, submitted dec bids, ERCOT flips a < coin?) < < If a generator fails to follow this instruction will it properly show up < as < an uninstructed deviation, or will ERCOT follow performance to these < direct < instructions some other way? < < Can this similar methodology be used on the incremental side to curb abuse < by those who manipulate their resource plans to create congestion they < will < be the only resource to correct? < < Have a great day! < < < ---------- < < From: < < manuel-munoz@reliantenergy.com[SMTP:manuel-munoz@reliantenergy.com] < < Sent: Sunday, November 26, 2000 7:45 PM < < To: isonp@ercot.com; piwg@ercot.com; operations@ercot.com < < Cc: kevin-gresham@reliantenergy.com; < Brenda_B_Harris@reliantenergy.com < < Subject: Suggested Solution to the PUC's Concerns Regarding Local < < Congestion < < < < <<File: Adib103100<<<<File: stoft-game.pdf<<<<File: < < stoft-intra-zonal.pdf<< < < In a memo from Parvis Adib dated Oct. 31 (copy attached), the PUC < < describes < < a serious concern on the part of the Commission regarding market abuse < < through relieving Local Congestion under the current Protocols. John < Meyer < < has asked me to draft a suggested solution to this concern. I am < < recommending the following solution and believe it should be very easy < to < < implement. < < < < THE PROBLEM: Gaming whereby an entity deliberately and chronically < places < < itself in a situation to create local congestion in order to profit from < < instructions to decrement its energy deliveries. < < < < The current language states that when a resource is instructed to < < decrement its energy deliveries and a Market Solution does not exist the < < resource's QSE will pay the minimum of the MCPE for that zone or 0. The < < trouble with this approach is that if the MCPE is negative the QSE is < < rewarded for having a resource causing local congestion. If the < situation < < persisted over time this could encourage inefficient generation to be < < built < < on the same area so that it can profit by having its output reduced or < < even < < turned off. < < < < Note that this would only happen in a situation where the local < congestion < < is located within a zone that is also susceptible to CSC congestion as < < well < < and the QSEs in such a zone are decremented most of the time which leads < < to < < high incidence of negative MCPE for the zone. This does not appear < likely < < but could occur if a zone is relatively small; i.e., dominated by QSEs < < that < < are few in number and that consistently overschedule across a CSC zone < < with < < the anticipation that they will always be instructed to decrement energy < < in < < real time. < < < < RECOMMENDED SOLUTION : < < < < Do not compensate or charge a resource that is instructed to decrement < its < < energy deliveries by ERCOT when a Market Solution does not exist in < < relieving local congestion. However, the resource must obey the < < instruction in order to maintain system reliability. < < < < Please give me your comments on this solution concept before Dec. 1. I < < am < < recommending that we add this as an item to vote on at the RUG meeting < < scheduled for Dec. 6. I will also draft the recommended language changes < < (very minor) to sections 6 and 7 and distribute it prior to the meeting. < < < < Manny < < < < < < (See attached file: Adib103100) < < < < (See attached file: stoft-game.pdf) < < < < (See attached file: stoft-intra-zonal.pdf) < < < < <
|