Enron Mail

From:sawestenberg@bpa.gov
To:abuckley@wutc.wa.gov, alan@epud.org, ali.rodol@ci.seattle.wa.us,archive-power-ratecase@bpa.gov, aw_turner@pgn.com, bassl@sce.com, bessex@cowlitzpud.org, bferranti@mbllp.com, bpadiscovery@merkellaw.com, ccopatrny@e-z.net, crow@millernash.com, cub@tel
Subject:WP-02 Data Response
Cc:
Bcc:
Date:Tue, 10 Apr 2001 10:02:00 -0700 (PDT)

request_number: PG-BPA: 134
firstname: Sarah
lastname: Westenberg
e-mail: sawestenberg@bpa.gov
exhibit_wp-02-e-: BPA-77
page_numbers: Attachment A, pages 14-15
request_text: Please state and explain the rationale for the proposal to u=
se=20
revenues to effectively allocate net augmentation costs between Slice and=
=20
non-Slice rates, rather than (a) the approach used to reflect other BPA cos=
ts=20
in the calculation of the Slice Rate, which was determined in BPA's Record =
of=20
Decision published in May 2000, or (b) the approach to this issue proposed =
by=20
BPA in the December 2000 Amended Proposal."



response_text: First, regarding the specific requests contained in this da=
ta=20
request, neither the ROD in May 2000 nor the December 2000 Amended Proposal=
=20
contained a methodology to adjust both Slice and non-Slice power rates=20
multiple times each year during the rate period for changes in BPA=01,s=20
augmentation costs. In fact, the issue now is not a Slice vs. non-Slice=20
issue. Rather, it is an issue of which power products subject to LB CRAC=
=20
recover what amount of the additional net augmentation costs.

The approaches to recovering net augmentation costs in May ROD and December=
=20
2000 Amended Proposal are different than that proposed in the Supplemental=
=20
Proposal. It simply is not possible to explain some distinction that is=20
alleged to be introduced in this Supplemental Proposal when neither the May=
=20
2000 or December 2000 proposals contained no method for calculating and the=
n=20
apportioning these costs in one way between individual power products. No=
=20
such segmentation was required in either of those two prior proposals.

In the May ROD, there was only one CRAC, which allocated the amount of=20
revenues to be raised by non-Slicer power products based on revenues=20
(WP-02-FS-BPA-02A, p. 283). However, that one CRAC did not attempt to=20
collect BPA=01,s net augmentation costs as the currently proposed LB CRAC=
=20
attempted to do.

In the December Amended Proposal, BPA proposed two very different methods f=
or=20
collecting net augmentation costs from customers. Slice share of=20
augmentation costs was determined based on share of the FBS. Non-Slice pow=
er=20
products=01, share of net augmentation costs was determined using loads. =
=20
Together, these two approaches collected more than 100% of BPA=01,s net=20
augmentation costs.
So, the Supplemental Proposal contains a new methodology to recover net=20
augmentation costs using twice-annual rate adjustments to all power product=
s=20
subject to LB CRAC. This new approach required a new methodology, and, as =
a=20
result, this new methodology cannot be directly compared to methodologies i=
n=20
the earlier proposals.

Second, turning to the broader question of the justification for using=20
revenues, there are several reasons why BPA considers this to be the correc=
t=20
approach.

The first policy objective driving the Amended Proposal and Supplemental=20
Proposal is that =01&It should be as simple as possible.=018 (WP-02-E-BPA-7=
0, pg.=20
6, line 4). One principle underlying settlement discussions was that the L=
B=20
CRAC method ought to assure that each power product subject to the LB CRAC =
is=20
charged with recovering the same percentage increase in revenue.

The approach to determining the equal percentage increases in revenue=20
required from each power product subject to LB CRAC is to use revenues in t=
he=20
determination of the LB CRAC%. In this calculation, net augmentation cost=
=20
are spread across the sum of all expected revenues from all power products=
=20
subject to LB CRAC for the entire 6-month duration of the LB CRAC. The=20
resulting percentage, referred to as LB CRAC%, is then applied equally to=
=20
each power product subject to the LB CRAC. This approach assures that each=
=20
separate power product, subject to the LB CRAC, will then have a revised ra=
te=20
that is determined using the same percentage increase in required revenue.

Additionally, the problem BPA is grappling with is one of sufficient=20
revenues. Net augmentation costs are expressed in dollars. Revenues from=
=20
power products without the LB CRAC is expressed in dollars. By spreading th=
e=20
former dollars over the latter dollars, and applying the resulting percenta=
ge=20
to revenues without the LB CRAC, results in incremental dollars required fr=
om=20
each separate power product that is subject to the LB CRAC. This appears =
to=20
BPA to be a very fair and equitable approach to recover net augmentation=20
costs.


The following information is from the web server:
1. Logon: IUSR_GRANITE
2. Remote Host: 53.180.74.220
3. Remote IP Address: 53.180.74.220
4. Form URL: =20
http://www.bpa.gov/power/secure/psp/ratecase/discovery/wp_02_response.html
5. Browser Client: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT; BPA 4.=
01=20
SP2; BPA 5.01 SP1)