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Enron Mail |
As I mentioned on the phone, SCE moved FERC (in the FERC docket investigati=
ng=20 the California market) for a subpoena to produce information from the ISO's= =20 Market Surveillance Committee. In particular, SCE is requesting informatio= n=20 that the MSC referenced in its December 4, 2000 report to the FERC, wherein= =20 it stated that "MSC stands ready to provide the Commission with what we=20 suspect are instances of the exercise of significant market power by specif= ic=20 market participants. We encourage not only the Commission, but other law= =20 enforcement agencies as well, to use their authority to request from these= =20 market participants the necessary information to confirm whether these=20 suspicions about the exercise of significant market power are in fact=20 correct." The MSC also stated that it "could provide a number of instances= =20 of what it suspects are suspicious bidding and scheduling behavior during t= he=20 summer and Autumn of 2000." Here's an outline of the positions I think we should make in an answer: The Commission should reject SoCal Edison's request for a subpoena because= =20 FERC did not set its investigation for hearing. Therefore, SCE's request i= s=20 a collateral attack on the Commission's order establishing the process for= =20 its investigation in this case. Further, it would allow Edison to access= =20 this information to pursue its case against power marketers while denying= =20 marketers an opportunity to prosecute their cases by denying them an equal= =20 opportunity to serve discovery upon others (including the UDCs). In the alternative, the Commission should allow all parties full discovery= =20 rights and establish an appropriate protective order. There may also be an argument that, since the MSC has delegated its authori= ty=20 by FERC, some of the information Edison requested might fall under the=20 deliberative process privilege. Gary Fergus suggested this argument. Not= =20 having done any legal research, I don't know how good of an argument it is. Are there any other arguments we should make? Should we have a conference= =20 call on this? Jim suggested that we should try to have WPTF file this answ= er=20 and I agreed. At first, I was thinking that it would be okay for Ron to=20 draft the answer for WPTF. However, on further consideration, if we end up= =20 wanting to argue that another member of WPTF exercised market power,=20 Bracewell would have a conflict of interest that would prohibit it from=20 representing us. Accordingly, WPTF should use other counsel. ---------------------- Forwarded by Mary Hain/HOU/ECT on 12/12/2000 12:51 P= M=20 --------------------------- Alan Comnes 12/12/2000 11:39 AM To: Mary Hain/HOU/ECT@ECT cc: =20 Subject: Questions on Joskow/Kahn Mary, Let me know if you think we can really data request SCE on this. Here are= =20 some questions that can surely be refined but give you an idea of the holes= =20 in their study. Appended to the comments of Southern California Edison Company ("SCE") is a= =20 study prepared by Paul Joskow and Edward P. Kahn, "A Quantitative Analysis = of=20 Pricing Behavior In California=01,s Wholesale Electricity Market During Sum= mer=20 2000," Exhibit A (hereinafter referred to as "Joskow and Kahn Study"). Wit= h=20 respect to this study: 1) Please provide a complete set of workpapers. Please provide all models= =20 used and input assumptions in machine-readable format along with any=20 additional narrative required to explain the results presented in the paper= s. 2) What is the estimated confidence interval (at 95%) of the competitive=20 benchmark prices (marginal costs) estimated in the study. 3) To the extent not provided in question 1 response, explain in detail=20 assumptions retarding including: a) Unit ramp-rate constraints;=20 b) Start-up costs including start-up fuel; c) Minimum-run time costs; and=20 d) Costs of running over noncontiguous awarded hours schedules.=20 4) Provide the precise allocation of hydroelectric generation in GWh=20 allocated to each load decile by month.=20 5) Provide the exact allocation of planned or maintenance in the study. Wh= y=20 was not actual outage data used? 6) Provide all other information considered on the elasticity of imports us= ed=20 in preparing the study other than the value chosen, which is derived=20 =01&loosely=018 from BBW? In the opinion of the authors, what is the confi= dence=20 interval of the elasticity estimate chosen? Further, provide California=20 competitive benchmark prices (marginal costs) assuming an elasticity of net= =20 imports of 0.175 and 0.66 (i.e., 1/2 and 2 times the value used in the=20 study). Present results in a format similar to Table 1.
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