![]() |
Enron Mail |
Michael Albers, Head of unit for Energy in DG Competition gave a talk on
competition priorities in Brussels yesterday. Highlights: Priorities for DG Comp are: 1) foster supply competition; for examlpe, new candidate for DG Comp's help has been identified in Belgium and it would be necesary to intervene to help this new competitor. In merger control, emphasis will be on supply solutions and not transmission market issues. 2) Crossborder Network Access: proceedings will be initiated after the summer re. French/Spanish and Dutch/Belgian borders. General policy will be spelt out in an Art. 19(3) notice on Viking Cable. [If we want to influence general policy we should make a submission on this before it appears: an Art 19(3) notice is a Commission Decision and constitutes a binding legal precedent. Although comments on Viking Cable can be made after the event, we would not be in a position to influence the policy published in the Notice. BD to follow up.] 3) Eligible customers should be able to choose their suppliers: most cases are resolved informally. 4) State Aid especially stranded costs; also environmental policy notice will have impact in this area (Nailia:please follow up.) Specific cases: On UK Gas Interconnector: no news. Long term Agreements (gas and electricity): "dominant firms cannot have exclusivity caluses, and long-term contracts as such may be a problem". SNAM/GAZPROM contracts: destination clauses are illegal, Commission to initiate proceedings after the Summer break; there will be no blue lining, meaning that in a contract where a clause is illegal, the Commission will press for the contract to be terminated, and not allow the contract to continue intact but the offending article 'blue lined' out. [This suggests we ought to offer some thoughts on draft model long term contracts.BD to follow up.] Applicable mutatis mutandisto GFU contracts. A gas case that will specify the limits of gas TPA regimes will be "heard more of after the summer break". (Access to Pipelines Case, TPA ex.-Emden, is my guess.) Gas Release Programmes: no indication that this was an emerging issue: Albers offered no views. Art 86(3) Directive -- cannot achieve what one can with an Art 95 Directive (I will write a separate explanation of this -- basically an Art 86(3) Directive cannot force regulatory structures on countries, i.e. a regulator, but can change a company's behaviour, i.e. account unbundling.) Any views welcome Brendan
|