Enron Mail

From:janine.migden@enron.com
To:jeff.ader@enron.com, mark.bernstein@enron.com, daniel.allegretti@enron.com,susan.landwehr@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, dave.mangskau@enron.com
Subject:Re: AEP - Brainstorming
Cc:adam.cooper@enron.com, charles.decker@enron.com, dave.laipple@enron.com,edward.baughman@enron.com, greg.sharp@enron.com, harry.kingerski@enron.com, james.steffes@enron.com, james.wood@enron.com, john.burrows@enron.com, kerry.stroup@enron.com, mike.r
Bcc:adam.cooper@enron.com, charles.decker@enron.com, dave.laipple@enron.com,edward.baughman@enron.com, greg.sharp@enron.com, harry.kingerski@enron.com, james.steffes@enron.com, james.wood@enron.com, john.burrows@enron.com, kerry.stroup@enron.com, mike.r
Date:Fri, 27 Apr 2001 03:52:00 -0700 (PDT)

My apologies for inadvertently leaving you off the distribution list. It was
late when I sent this out...

Additional thoughts that may not have been fully articulated in my first
email and which Mike Roan and I discussed this morning...

To get CSP up to the 20% mark, we could do a preemptive default service deal,
whereby we negotiate to take enough of CSP's customers to get them to the 20%
within a customer class. The deal could be with commercial or residential
customers. I don't think we could do much with industrials because the
shopping credit is fairly low. The shopping credits are as follows:

Residential Non-heat - 5.12
Total Residential - 3.94
Commercial - 5.88, 5.79, 4.06, 3.22 for GS-1, GS-2, GS-3, GS-4 respectively.
Industrial - 3.88, 2.01, 2.71

The customer load by class in CSP's service territory for 2001 as estimated
in AEP's 2000 Longterm Forecast Report is as follows:

Residential - 6,351,000 MWH x 20% = 1,270,000 MWH
Commercial - 6,707,000 MWH x 20% = 1,341,400 MWH
Industrial - 3,241,000 MWH x 20% = 648,000 MWH

The numbers multipled by the 20% switch is the approximation of load that
would have to switch to an alternative supplier to free-up CSP's generation
and get it to market based rates.

Please feel free to provide comments and suggestions.
Janine









Janine Migden
04/26/2001 09:33 PM

To: Greg Sharp/HOU/EES@EES, James M Wood/HOU/EES@EES, Dave S
Laipple/DUB/EES@EES, Adam Cooper/DUB/EES@EES, Nicole Schwartz/HOU/EES@EES,
John D Burrows/HOU/EES@EES, Harry Kingerski/NA/Enron@Enron, James D
Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron, Charles Decker/HOU/EES@EES, Mike
Roan/ENRON@enronXgate, Edward D Baughman/Enron@EnronXGate, Kerry
Stroup/NA/Enron@Enron
cc: Richard Shapiro/NA/Enron@Enron, (bcc: Janine Migden/NA/Enron)
Subject: AEP - Brainstorming

Below is a concept to perhaps solve the problem confronting EES and the Ohio
market. It is a work in progress so suggestions and troubleshooting are
welcomed.

Problem - There is uncertainty about EES's ability to pursue what had been
perceived as value propositions in the Columbus Southern Power (AEP) and
Cinergy markets because of changes in our price curves. These changes
reflect the difficulty of offering a physical product due to concerns
regarding load following and imbalances.

Proposed Solution - Negotiate a power swap with AEP and/or Cinergy.

How the Proposal Works - Under the proposal, EESI would enter into a
contract with the customer to deliver power below the shopping credit,
thereby offering savings to the customer. EESI would then enter into a
contract with AEP to provide the power including load following as it
currently does (similar to the market support generation concept). EESI
could agree to pay AEP a modest sum (a few mils/kwh, for example) as an
incentive to do the deal. EESI would also enter into a contract with ENA to
procure on- peak and off- peak replacement power for AEP at a cost equal to
or less than the price EESI is charging to its customer, minus a percentage
or millage which would be EESI's profit on the deal. ENA would contract with
AEP to provide the on-peak and off-peak power in the same quantities as AEP
is providing to EESI customers.

The term of the deal would be a maximum of five years of until the RTO
adequately addresses load following, whichever comes first. The amount of the
capacity swap could be limited to either a certain megawatt amount or be up
to the amound required to get AEP to its 20%.

Why AEP Might Consider the Deal - Currently, there is no customer switching
in the AEP service territory. Under SB 3, if less than 20% of the customers
switch by the end of 2003, then the Commission must initiate a proceeding to
address why. The expected outcome would be to raise the shopping credit,
which probably would not be an outcome AEP would seek. If no switching
continues to be the issue, the Commission could take action sooner. Also,
under SB 3, if 20% of customers switch, anytime after mid-2003, any party,
including the utility, can petition the Commission to go to market based
rates and end the market development (transition) period. It is my belief
that AEP will want to end the market development period as quickly as
possible for two reasons. First, they have very little stranded generation
assets and will have probably recovered them by some time in 2003. Their
Regulatory Asset Charge (which is where all there stranded costs really are)
is a surcharge that they will be allowed to recover irrespective of when the
Market Development Period ends. The most compelling reason for AEP to
consider this proposal is that market prices are high and AEP is unable to
take advantage of market conditions to the degree that they would probably
like because their resources are dedicated to providing default power at low
rates. This proposal would give them a mechanism to free up generation to
sell in the competitive market and earn a higher return. Finally, the swap
leaves AEP somewhat indifferent and the millage adder, EESI could add to the
deal is just extra profit for them.

Benefits to EESI - EESI gets to do its deals, make a profit and get a strong
foothold in the Ohio market. EESI also gets a competitive edge over other
marketers by securing physical capability. Third, by moving AEP more quickly
to market- based rates, this adds uncertainty in the market which Enron
thrives on. Fourth, once AEP goes to market-based rates they are required to
conduct a competitive bid for default service. This could potentially
accelerate by as much as two and a half years, the opportuntity for an EESI
play as the default service provider.

Benefit to ENA - This provides ENA a large, longterm wholesale transaction.
ENA's profit would be the difference between what EESI pays ENA (as described
above) and the price at which it procures the power.

Benefit to Customers - The customers get the benefit of lower rates and
savings that are measured as the difference between the shopping credit and
the price negotiated with EESI. They are indifferent as to the source of the
power.

Next Steps - Assuming this looks like an idea that can work, I would set up a
lunch meeting with Rich Munzinski, Senior VP who negotiated the settlements
to explore this concept with him. Rich is very practical and very
bottom-line oriented. If he thinks this is good for AEP, he might be willing
to carry the water internally on this. Judging from several years of
negotiating with him in Ohio and elsewhere, I think there is a reasonable
chance he would be receptive. I could also arrange a similar meeting with
Jim Gainer, VP, legal counsel for Cinergy in the settlements. I have a good
relationship with Jim and find him to be practical and straightforward. If
he thinks this has merit, he will take it up with Jim Turner, president of
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, who I also have a good relationship
with, although not as close.

Please let me know your thoughts and suggestions.
Thank you,
Janine