Enron Mail

From:dave.perrino@enron.com
To:james.steffes@enron.com
Subject:RTO top 10 (6)
Cc:steve.walton@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, alan.comnes@enron.com
Bcc:steve.walton@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, alan.comnes@enron.com
Date:Thu, 21 Jun 2001 14:18:00 -0700 (PDT)

Jim,

As per our meeting on Jun 15 below is a list of my top 10 (6) RTO issues:

Independent Board with stakeholder (advisory) board(s). Once an RTO become=
s fully funded and operational it is essential that there is an independent=
group of individuals responsible for making business decisions. However b=
eneath this organization should be specific stakeholder groups which work o=
ut details of issues to be decided upon by the Board. The advisory groups =
should included at least a planning, market operations and monitoring commi=
ttees.
Balancing Energy / Ancillary Service Market(s). (Defining market as a plac=
e for participants to conduct trading business - not commit resources as in=
PJM, ISO-NE or NY and a place for the RTO to "post" requirements for ancil=
lary services, etc.) The market does not have to be run directly by the RT=
O but I believe, for the sake of liquidity, you need one centrally utilized=
(endorsed) market available for participants to access. This would NOT pre=
clude any other markets from operating in parallel. Based upon the CA expe=
rience, where, once the CalPX folded, there was not a significant increase =
in activity on APX. Our real time traders need a market with sufficient de=
pth to be able to liquidate outstanding positions in the physical market. =
Without a single balancing energy/ancillary service market operated or sanc=
tioned by the RTO these markets would become disbursed and we would suffer =
until the market itself sorted out which one it preferred to use.
Congestion Management - The rights can either be physical or financial. Th=
ere are two key elements, there needs to be some type of flow-based methodo=
logy for assignment and scheduling, and there must be a form of "use-it or =
lose-it" stipulation. First, the mapping of the rights to the actual use o=
f the system eliminates ahead of time most of the curtailments currently be=
ing experienced in the eastern interconnection. A flow-based reservation a=
nd scheduling scheme, with proper information sent to the market, allows pa=
rticipants to be pro-active in resolving any potential congestion either by=
re-scheduling, offering counter-flows or simly accepting re-dispatch costs=
. Second with no use it or lose it rule there will not be a robust seconda=
ry market of unused transmission rights. All one has to do is look at the l=
ack of liquidity and trading of FTR's in PJM and CA and TCCs in NY to see t=
here is NO incenmtive for the holders of those rights to dispose of unused =
rights or sell them to an entitiy who would find value in acquiring them. =
A secondary market for transmission rights is essential for several reasons=
not the least of which is initial distribution of rights to incumbents and=
grandfathered contracts. If these two procedures limit the amount of avai=
lable transmission on a firm basis to the market, at least with a well desi=
gned secondary market this should make transmission capability available, a=
t least on a short-term basis. In addition it is key that the RTO process =
schedules in a timely manner and post to the marketplace unused transmissio=
n capability which would be available on some type of recallable basis.
Interconnection Agreement - If at all possible there should be an RTO-wide =
interconnection agreement (IA) available. In DSTAR the stakeholder group h=
ad reached a consensus that they should have a regional IA, however before =
the TO's filed their informational filing with FERC they pulled the common =
IA and plan on filing TO specific IA's. (Not being familiar with state by =
state rules the possibility for a multi-state RTO to actually implement a r=
egion wide IA may not be possible, but we should still promote this concept=
.)
Penalties - Depending upon design we need to be vigilant to biased ancillar=
y service and scheduling requirements and penalties.
Web Site - This may be better described as market data transparency. It wo=
uld be better to be inundated with market information, as with PJM, than no=
t to have information, as with the CAISO. Transparent pricing information =
has NOT hurt the PJM region, in fact it has more than likely helped keep th=
e markets operating as well as they have. In the case of DSTAR it would ap=
pear that they should have sufficient market data posted, but as with every=
thing else we need to remain vigilant.=20

I hope you find these comments useful. I'd be happy to discuss them with y=
ou anytime.

Kind Reagrds,

Dave